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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This case involves an automobile collision that occurred on December 8, 2008, in
Rexburg, Idaho, between a vehicle driven by plaintiffi'appellant Larry Hansen and a vehicle
driven by defendant/respondent Matthew Roberts.l R. 14. Mr. Hansen claimed injuries as a result
of the collision. R 14-15. Mr. Roberts claimed property damage as a result of the collision. Rl1.
While plaintiff states the collision definitively "caused" the claimed injuries of Mr. Hansen, this
was a disputed issue at trial ofthis matter, and the jury found Mr. Roberts' conduct did not cause
Mr. Hansen's injuries. R. 205.
B.

Course of proceedings

Mr. Hansen filed a complaint on May 26, 2009, in Bonneville County District Court to
recover his claimed damages. R. 13-16. Mr. Roberts filed a small claims complaint in Madison
County Magistrate Court on August 3, 2009, to recover his claimed property damage. R. 11.
Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, these two matters were consolidated into one case
on October 14,2009. R 17-18.
Trial in this matter commenced on October 19, 2010. Tr. p. 68. After the first day of trial,
Mr. Roberts received a telephone call from the University of Utah stating a matching liver had
been found for him, and asking him to proceed to Salt Lake City for a liver transplant procedure.
Tr. p. 224, LL. 7-10. Trial was continued and the second day of trial was held December 15,
2010. Tr. p. 256.

1 Matthew Roberts, technically, was also a plaintiff in his small claims action. However, for ease of reference, and order of
presentation of evidence, the trial court determined Mr. Hansen would be referred to as the "plaintiff" and Mr. Roberts would be
referred to the "defendant." Mr. Roberts will continue with these references herein, for purposes of consistency in the record.

1

At the end ofthe second day oftrial, the jury returned a verdict in this matter finding both
parties negligent and attributing 90% 0 f the negligence to Mr. Hansen and 10% 0 f the negligence
to Mr. Roberts. R. 204-206. The jury also found Mr. Roberts' negligence was not a proximate
cause of the damages claimed by Mr. Hansen. R. 204-206. Finally, the jury found Mr. Hansen's
negligence was the proximate cause of the property damage claimed by Matthew Roberts. R.
204-206. Therefore a judgment was entered in favor ofMr. Roberts in the amount of$3,399.14.
R. 500-502.

C.

Statement of the Facts

The facts of what occurred during the subject automobile collision are disputed. Plaintiff
claims defendant attempted to pass him illegally on the right. Tr. p. 135, LL. 16-20. It is
defendant's position plaintiff attempted an illegal right-hand tum into a parking lot, from the
middle of the roadway, across his lane of travel. Tr. p. 143, L. 7 though p. 144, L. 15. What is
not disputed is that this accident occurred in an area where a one-lane road expanded into a
three-lane road. It is also undisputed a collision occurred between the vehicle driven by
plaintiffi'appellant Mr. Hansen and the vehicle driven by defendant/respondent Matthew Roberts.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
In his original Notice of Appeal, Mr. Hansen listed ten potential issues on appeal in this
matter, but it appears these have now been narrowed to five issues. Plaintiff has framed these
issues in a manner indicating his position, thereby indicating his position is accurate. Defendant
submits the following are the true issues on appeal:
1.
Whether the trial court was within its discretion in denying plaintiffs unsupported
verbal motion to exclude defendant's two expert witnesses from testifYing, which was made on
December 15, 2010, at the beginning of the continued second day of trial;

2.
Whether plaintiff has preserved for appeal any objections to the expert witness
opinion testimony of Scott Kimbrough;
2

3.
Whether the trial court was within its discretion in allowing Scott Kimbrough to
testifY to typical accident reconstruction expert opinions;
4.
Whether the trial court was within its discretion in denying plaintiff's objection to
the testimony of John Droge on the basis biomechanicallbiomedical engineering is not a reliable
SCIence;
5.
Whether the admission of the testimony of John Droge was harmless error, if any
error occurred;
6.
Whether the trial court was within its discretion in ruling the plaintiff had waived
his objections to the video trial testimony of Matthew Roberts due to plaintiffs failure to timely
move to strike the subject portion of the DVD, which required editing prior to submission to the
JUry;

7.
Whether plaintiffs objections voiced during the taking of the video trial
testimony of Matthew Roberts were valid;
8.
Whether the video trial testimony of Matthew Roberts that plaintiff argues should
not have been allowed, if it was allowed in error, was harmless error;
9.
Whether the trial court was within its discretion in granting defendant's motion in
limine regarding the raising of the issue of insurance during trial of this matter;
10.
Whether plaintiffs new objections to defendant's motion in limine regarding
insurance were preserved for appeal;
11.
harmless.

Whether the trial court's error, if any, regarding defendant's motion in limine was

ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL

Defendant respectfully requests the Court determine the issue of whether defendant is
entitled to attorney fees on appeal in this matter.
I.
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESSES PROPERLY AND APPROPRIATELY
TESTIFIED AT TRIAL OF THIS MATTER

Plaintiff has launched a three-prong attack against the two expert witnesses who testified
during the second day of trial of this matter, on December 15,2010, during defendant's case in
3

chief 2 It is defendant's position these experts were timely and properly disclosed, especially
given the delays and numerous motions defendant was forced to file to obtain Rule 26(b)(4)
disclosures and depositions from plaintiff relative to his experts in this matter. Furthermore,
defendant's experts clearly testified to appropriate expert witness opinions, and had ample
foundation to testifY to these opinions. One of these witnesses, Scott Kimbrough, testified as an
accident reconstruction expert. Tr. p. 351, L. 10 through p. 381, L. 15. The second expert, John
Droge, testified as a biomedical engineer. Tr. p. 388, L. 8 through p. 421, L. 25.
A. Defendant's Disclosure Of His Experts Were Timely; Trial Court Did Not Abuse
Its Discretion; Any Error Regarding John Droge Was Harmless.

According to the trial court's March 31, 2010, order setting trial and pretrial conference,
the parties were to disclose the names, addresses and telephone numbers of expert witnesses who
may be called to testifY at trial, not later than 90 days before the date set for trial. R. p. 34. The
court did not order Rule 26(b)( 4) disclosures. R. p. 34.

Defendant provided the information

required by the Court's March 31, 201 0, order to plaintiff on July 21, 2010, for Scott
Kimbrough. R. p. 38-42.
Within the July 21, 2010, Defendant's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, defendant
specifically stated discovery was ongoing and the disclosure may be updated. R. p. 40.
Defendant also specifically stated plaintiff had failed to provide all of the medical records and
radiology films requested in discovery and reserved the right supplement his expert witness
disclosure. Id. Defendant furthermore reserved the right to supplement his disclosure "in the
event additional facts and information become known prior to trial that would necessitate
defendant to retain additional expert witnesses." R. p. 41.
2 Defendant agrees with plaintiff that the standard of review on appeal of trial court's decisions on each of these
three issues regarding experts is an abuse of discretion standard.
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Importantly, defendant pointed out that plaintiff had failed to respond to defendant's Rule
26(b)(4) discovery requests, and specifically stated in his disclosures as follows:
Plaintiff has failed to respond to defendant's discovery requests seeking
information regarding plaintiffs expert witnesses. Since plaintiff has the burden
of proof in this case, defendant's expert witnesses essentially are rebuttal expert
witnesses. Therefore, defendant reserves the right to supplement this discovery
response and provide information regarding rebuttal expert witnesses once
plaintiff has responded to defendant's discovery request.
Id.

Finally, defendant reserved the right to supplement his disclosure "in the event the
testimony and opinions rendered by any expert witness retained by plaintiff... required defendant
to retain additional expert witnesses." Id.
Scott Kimbrough was disclosed in the July 21,2010, document. R. p. 38. 3
Despite significant efforts to obtain his deposition (R. p. 43-63; Tr. p. 3, L. 1-8), plaintiff
was not produced for deposition until September 6,2010. R. p. 59-63. Tr. p. 333, LL. 3-9.
Nevertheless, defendant also propounded discovery requests to plaintiff, Mr. Hansen, on
February 8,2010, which included Rule 26(b)(4) interrogatories. R. p. 71-74. Plaintiff responded
on March 11, 2010, but failed to respond to the Rule 26(b)(4) discovery requests. R. p. 75-76.
Plaintiff further supplemented his discovery responses on August 10, 2010, but still no opinions
were provided, only general statements about how plaintiffs treating medical care providers
might be considered experts. R. p. 77-78. Therefore, defendant was forced to file a motion to
strike plaintiffs experts, or in the alternative a motion to compel discovery responses. R. p. 6465.
3 Plaintiff has included a statement in his timeline that Scott Kimbrough was "retained" in August, 2010. Plaintiff points to Dr.
Kimbrough's testimony in this regard. However, Dr. Kimbrough only testified "nothing shows up as billable" until August. Tr. p. 379,
L. 17 through p. 380, L. 1. Furthermore, the question asked of Dr. Kimbrough was not when he was "retained," but when he was
first "contacted by Ms. Brizee." Id. Nevertheless, plaintiff's counsel and defense counsel discussed expert witness disclosures on
July 19, 2010, and expert witnesses were contacted by defense counsel on that same date. (R. p. 258) so defendant, at the very
least, was discussing expert witness reviews with witnesses on July 19, 2010.

5

As outlined in defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike
Experts, or in the Alternative, to Compel Discovery Responses, plaintiff produced, late,
numerous new medical records on September 6, 2010. R. p. 68, fu 1. See also, Tr. p. 3, LL. 917. Also on that same date, there was testimony by plaintiff of a potential pre-existing condition,
but no medical records had been produced regarding the same. Id. Further, defendant had
requested the plaintiff provide radiological films so that his experts could complete their
evaluation and finalize their opinions. Id. Only some of the films requested were produced and
they were produced late, again on September 6, 2010. Id.
In this same Memorandum, defendant pointed out to the court that he had not yet been
able to fully disclose his experts because 0 f the lack 0 f full disclosure on the part 0 f plaintiffs. R.
p. 68. Defendant asked the court to strike plaintiff's experts, or in the alternative, to compel
plaintiff to provide expert witness opinions within three days of the September 13, 2010, hearing.

R. p. 69-70.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to strike, plaintiff attempted to argue "most of' the
information to be testified to by his experts would be factual. Tr. p. 5, LL. 14-17. However, as
the court noted, any testimony about the nature, extent and duration of the injury, the need for
ongoing treatment or future surgery, etc. would be expert witness opinion testimony that needed
to be disclosed per the Rule 26(b)(4) interrogatories propounded by defendant on plaintiff. Tr. p.
5, L. 18 through p. 6, L. 15. 4 As pointed out during the hearing, the medical records themselves
provided !!.Q information relative to whether the subject accident caused the claimed wrist injury,
or whether the plaintiff needed a second surgery, as claimed in plaintiff's deposition by plaintiff.
4 Defendant also refers the court to the hearing of October 5,2010, on Defendant's Motion to Strike Dr. Jost and in
the Alternative, to Compel Discovery Responses due to plaintiff's failure to produce Dr. Jost for deposition, wherein
Judge Shindurling admonished plaintiff for his failure to respond timely to discovery requests. Tr. p. 14, LL. 6-14.

6

Tr. p. 8, L. 15 through p. 9, L. 7.

Furthermore, plaintiff had listed accident reconstruction

experts, but had not provided any opinions. R. p. 77-78.
The Honorable Jon. J. Shindurling declined to strike plaintiffs experts, but instead
granted the motion to compel and ordered the plaintiff to answer defendant's Rule 26(b)(4)
discovery responses by September 20, 2010. R. p. 81-82, 83-84. Plaintiff faxed supplemental
discovery responses to defendant at 9:37 p.m. on September 20, 2010, which were not received
until September 21,2010. R. p. 104.
As a result of this late Rule 26(b)(4) opinions of plaintiffs experts, defendant retained
Dr. John Droge as a causation witness. When defendant disclosed John Droge, defendant alerted
the Court and counsel that he had just been retained on September 29, 2010, and the
determination was made on October 1, 2010, that he would be called to testifY at trial of this
matter. R. p. 111. Defendant submits again, it had just received plaintiffs expert's opinions on
September 21,2010. Therefore, defendant, within six business days, retained a rebuttal expert to
Dr. Jost's newly-disclosed alleged opinions, and within two days had supplied that rebuttal
expert's opinions to plaintiff. Defendant submits he acted with due diligence and supplemented
his disclosures and discovery responses seasonably. On October 1, 2010, both John Droge's
name as well as his opinions were provided to plaintiff. R. p. 115-116. 5
It should be noted, again, the Court's March 31,2010, order did not require Rule 26(b)(4)

disclosures. R. p. 34. It only required the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of expert
witnesses. R. p. 34. Therefore, Scott Kimbrough, who's name was disclosed to plaintiff on July
21, 2010 (R. p. 38-42) was certainly timely disclosed, per the court's order. His opinions were
5 Plaintiff attempts to argue John Droge's opinions were not disclosed until October 4, 2010. However, if plaintiff will review the
discovery produced on October 4, 2010, he will realize the October 4, 2010, supplemental discovery response was to provide trial
exhibits, and that John Droge's opinions were disclosed on October 1, 2010. R. p. 115-116.
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disclosed on September 24, 2010, within three days of receiving plaintiff's experts' opinions and
within 18 days ofplaintiff's deposition. (R. p. 86-87).
Furthermore, it was due to plaintiff's own refusal to respond to defendant's Rule
26(b)( 4) discovery requests, and the fact defendant was forced to file a motion to compel to
obtain the opinions of plaintiff's experts, that led to the inability of defendant to determine the
need for additional experts. Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain of a situation he himself
created. Upon receipt, finally, of plaintiff's expert's opinions, on September 21, 2010, defendant
worked very diligently to retain and disclose any additional experts needed for trial.
Nevertheless, Scott Kimbrough and John Droge did not testifY until the second day of
trial, on December 15, 2010. Tr. p. 388. Therefore, John Droge was disclosed 76 days prior to
his trial testimony. 6 There was ample time for plaintiff to do a number of things during this time
period if he believed he was prejudiced by John Droge's disclosure. Plaintiff could have deposed
John Droge, or could have filed a motion to strike John Droge, or a motion in limine. The same
is true of Scott Kimbrough. Plaintiff did none of these.
Instead, plaintiff's counsel moved to strike Scott Kimbrough and John Droge
immediately prior to their trial testimony, on December 15, 2010, the day they were scheduled to
testifY, and were already present to testifY. Plaintiff provided scant information as far as the basis
for the motion, and provided no written record to the Court. Tr. p. 328, L. 5 through p. 338, L.
17. Notably, no explanation was provided as to why this issue had not been brought forward by

6 For this reason, plaintiff's reliance on Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86,813 P.2d 897 (1991) is misplaced. In Radmer, no
disclosure was provided for a new theory of liability advocated by plaintiff until the first day of trial. Id. at 89-90. It is ironic that
defendant had to file a motion to compel plaintiff's expert's opinions in this matter, yet plaintiff relies on a case discussing a party's
responsibility to supplement his disclosures. Also distinguishable is Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 158, 45 P.3d 810, 814 (2002)
wherein the defendant did not disclose the expert's opinions until the middle of trial, and Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271,
647 P.2d 311, 317 (CLApp. 1982), wherein a new witness was disclosed at 4 p.m. the day before trial. No such situation existed in
the case at bar.
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plaintiff prior to the very day the two experts were scheduled to testifY. This is especially
concerning considering the interim two-month delay in trial, when there were numerous options
for plaintiff to explore, and ample opportunity to resolve this issue, if he believed he had been
prejudiced. Defendant submits the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant
plaintiffs unsupported motion to strike defendant's expert witnesses.
Finally, it must be noted the jury in this matter found Mr. Hansen 90 percent negligent,
and Matt Roberts 10 percent negligent. The jury verdict form was such that the jury was asked to
address the causation questions prior to determining percentages of negligence of each party. R.
p. 204-206. However, per Idaho Code §6-801, since plaintiff Mr. Hansen's negligence was
greater than defendant Matthew Roberts' negligence, plaintiff could not recover any
damages, no matter how the jury answered the causation question. I.e. §6- 801.

John Droge's testimony was purely related to the question of causation. Tr. p. 393, LL.
14-24. Therefore, even if there was an error on the part of the trial court, as far as John Droge, it
was harmless error, at best. An appellate court will not reverse the district court if the alleged
error is harmless. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504, 95 P.3d 977, 986
(2004). "[I]f an error did not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not affect the result
of the trial, the error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Id. See Martin v. Hackworth, 127
Idaho 68, 70, 896 P.2d 976, 978 (1995); Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., III Idaho 594, 608,
726 P.2d 706, 718 (1986).
Plaintiff does not provide this Court any argument or proof that a substantial right has
been affected by John Droge's testimony. Moreover, any error regarding the same cannot be
deemed to have affected the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, Scott Kimbrough was timely
disclosed, per the Court's order. R. p. 38-42.
9

Defendant submits, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff's motion to exclude Scott Kimbrough and John Droge from testifYing at trial, especially
given the information, or lack thereof, provided to the court by plaintiff, and especially given
plaintiff's delay and failure to seasonably supplement his own discovery responses regarding
expert witnesses.
B. Scott Kimbrough Testified Appropriately; Plaintiff Waived His Right To Object
To This Testimony

Plaintiff next argues an accident reconstruction expert should not be allowed to testifY to
his opinions. Of note, the trial court instructed plaintiff's counsel to make his objections at the
time of the testimony. Tr. p. 338, L. 20 through p. 339, L. 5. However, plaintiff's counsel failed
to make any objections to the questions asked during Scott Kimbrough's testimony. Plaintiff,
therefore, has waived his right to bring this issue before this Court. By failing to object, as
instructed by the court, plaintiff has not preserved this issue on appeal, as there was no
opportunity for the court to rule on this perceived issue.
As a general rule, the Idaho Supreme Court will not consider error not preserved for
appeal by an objection at trial. State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 784, 241 P.3d 955, 957 (2010).
See Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 921,104 P.3d 958,963 (2004); State v. Barnes, 147 Idaho
587,597,212 P.3d 1017, 1027 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a
proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal") (quoting State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000)).
The purpose of this limitation on appellate court authority is to require the timely raising
of claims and objections thereby allowing the trial court the opportunity to consider and resolve
the same. State v. Longest, 149 Idaho at 784, 241 P.3d at 957. The trial court is in the best
10

position to detennme the relevant facts and to resolve the dispute. Id. The requirement of a
contemporaneous objection prevents a party from "sandbagging the court ... (by) remaining
silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error if the case is not decided in his or her
favor." Id., citing State v. Perry, 2010 WL, 2880156 (2010).7 In order for an objection to be
preserved for appellate review, the party must either clearly provide the specific ground for the
objection or the basis of the objection must be clear from the context of the trial record. Slack v.

Kelleher, 140 Idaho at 921, 104 P.3d at 963.
Plaintiff argues error regarding Mr. Kimbrough's testimony that the accident was "caused"
by plaintiffs careless right hand tum. Appellant's Brie±: p. 11. Preliminarily, it must be noted that
plaintiff has misstated Scott Kimbrough's testimony in this regard.

Scott Kimbrough's

testimony was that ''this accident was precipitated by a careless right-hand tum by the
plaintiff.... " Tr. p. 357, LL. 15-17. Notably, there were no objections to the question that was
asked prior to this testimony. Plaintiff never raised a contemporaneous and timely objection to
this testimony, and therefore, failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Tr. p. 357, LL. 10-23.
Plaintiff also misstates the basis for Scott Kimbrough's opinions (Appellant's Brie±: p.
11) by leaving out the following basis also testified to by Scott Kimbrough: (1) observing the
behavior of other vehicles approaching the intersection; (2) measuring and obtaining key
dimensions of the intersection, and (3) speaking with Matthew Roberts. Tr. p. 356, L. 7 through
p. 357, L. 4.
Plaintiff appears to assert error pertaining to Mr. Kimbrough's testimony on the basis he
developed his opinion by reading the police report, reading the plaintiffs deposition, reviewing

7 The Longest court cited to the first State v. Perry decision, which was withdrawn. However, the same language was included in
the replacement case. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961,976 (2010).
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the accident site on Google Earth, visiting the accident site, and speaking with an ex-highway
patrolman. Tr. p. 356, L. 7 through p. 357, L. 4. Yet, plaintiff failed to raise a timely objection at
the time of this testimony. See ld. As such, plaintiff failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
Plaintiff argues error regarding Mr. Kimbrough's testimony that defendant's conduct was
reasonable and the plaintiffs conduct was not reasonable. Tr. p. 369, L. 19 through p. 370, L. 22.
Again, plaintiff failed to raise a contemporaneous and timely objection at the time of this
testimony. See Id. As a result, plaintiff failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
Plaintiff asserts error relating to Mr. Kimbrough's testimony that his opinions were based
upon his personal weighing of the evidenceS and that he was allegedly no better than the jury in
reviewing the evidence. Tr. p. 374, L. 24 through p. 375, L. 15. However, Mr. Kimbrough did
not testifY he reached his opinions by "weighing the evidence" until asked that specifically
worded and leading question by plaintiffs counsel. Tr. p. 374, L. 24 through p. 375, L. 15.
This testimony was elicited on cross-examination by plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiff cannot
now be heard to denounce testimony that he roused. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66, 844 P.2d
691, 695 (1992). Doing so constitutes invited error, and is not pennitted. Id. A party may not
successfully complain of errors that he or she has acquiesced in or invited. State v. Owsley, 105
Idaho 836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438 (1983), citing Walling v. Walling, 36 Idaho 710, 214 P. 218
(1923). Errors which are consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible. Id., citing
Frank v. Frank, 47 Idaho 217, 273 P. 943 (1929). Thus, plaintiffs allegation of error on this

issue must fail.

8 Plaintiff cites the Court to State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27 (1988) for the proposition that an expert cannot "render an
opinion regarding the weight of disputed evidence." Appellant's Brief, p. 11. However, this is not what the Hester court ruled.
Additionally, expert "opinion" testimony is exactly that --the expert's opinion based upon his review of the evidence and information.
That is the very essence and nature of expert witness testimony.
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Furthermore, a close reVIew of the exchange between plaintiffs counsel and Scott
Kimbrough shows the testimony in this regard was in the context of only one of Scott
Kimbrough's opinions -

his opinion that Mr. Hansen did not use his turn signal prior to the

collision. Tr. p. 374, L. 15 through p. 375, L. 15. The initiating question by plaintiffs counsel
related to the turn signal issue, and the second question still related to the turn signal issue and
Matthew Roberts' thought process. Id.
Plaintiff also asserts error on the grounds Scott Kimbrough's testimony did not assist the
JUry and allegedly invaded the province of the jury. Plaintiffs argument is improper. The
question of admissibility of an expert opinion is one for the trial court. I.R.E. 104(a); I.R.E. 702.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 requires that expert testimony be helpful to the determination of a fact
in issue, and that the witness be properly qualified. I.R.E. 702. The Idaho Rule of Evidence 704 also
provides that expert testimony in the form of an opinion or inference, which is otherwise admissible,
is not objectionable simply because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
I.R.E. 704. See Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 760, 215 P.3d 476, 480 (2009). Further, the
trial court's decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Vendelin v.
Costeo Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 429,95 P.3d 34,47 (2004).

In State v. Corwin, 147 Idaho 893, 216 P.3d 651 (Ct. App. 2009), the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted police officers to
testifY that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and too impaired to operate a motor
vehicle. Id., 147 Idaho at 897, 216 P.3d at 655. The officers descnbed their observations of the
defendant, including his behaviors, and as a result, determined he was under the influence of alcohol
and too impaired to drive. Id., 147 Idaho at 896, 216 P.3d at 654. The Court of Appeals ruled that
even though the officers' observations of the defendant directly related to an ultimate issue of fact,
13

their testimonies regarding the same did not invade the province of the jury as to its determination
of whether the defendant was or was not guilty of having driven a vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol.ld., 147 Idaho at 896-897, 216 P.3d at 654-655.
Likewise, in the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
testimony and opinions of Scott Kimbrough Scott Kimbrough is a qualified expert regarding
accident reconstruction. His testimony assisted the jury in determining facts in issue in the case,
specifically, the events which occurred during the subject traffic collision. His testimony and
opinions did not invade the province of the jury regarding its determination of liability as to the
subject collision, or of negligence. Scott Kimbrough never testified about a duty on the part of either
party or a breach of any duty. He never testified about fault or responsibility. Instead, he provided
information not known to the jury and not within the common knowledge of the jury. He testified
about the configuration of the intersection, how traffic flows through this intersection, and how
many lanes were present in the unmarked area where the accident occurred.

Tr. p. 360, L. 12

through p. 362, L. 19; p. 366, LL.I-16; p. 361, LL. 8-15. During cross-examination by plaintiffs
counsel, Scott Kimbrough testified about mechanical drag, stopping/slowing distances and
deceleration of vehicles. Tr. p. 371, L. 3 through p. 372, L. 19. Upon further questioning from
plaintiffs

counse~

Scott Kimbrough testified regarding the speeds of the vehicles prior to impact

and at the time ofimpact. Tr. p. 375, LL. 16-21; p. 377, L. 17 throughp. 378, L. 22.
None of these issues are within the common knowledge of a layperson, and have been
testified to on numerous occasions in Idaho courtrooms. See eg. Harris v. Sawtelle Rentals. Inc.,
133 Idaho 199, 203, 984 P2d. 122, 126 (1999) (accident reconstructionist expert testified to
speed, critical speed of subject curve, defendant's speed exceeded critical speed of curve).
Therefore, the trial court properly admitted Scott Kimbrough's testimony.
14

Defendant respectfully submits the testimony of Scott Kimbrough did not invade the
province ofthe jury, and the judgment in this matter should stand.

C.

Issue Regarding John Droge Is Moot Due To Comparative Negligence
Finding By Jury; John Droge's Area Of Expertise Is Valid, Scientifically
Reliable; Plaintiff Failed To Preserve Objections

Next, Plaintiff claims the testimony of defendant's biomechanicallbiomedical engineer,
John Droge, should not have been allowed because defendant failed to provide adequate
foundation for the same. A review of the trial transcript on this issue shows not only that there
was sufficient foundation, but also that plaintiff declined to question the witness in aid of his
own objection, and further did not object to specific questions during the testimony.
Nevertheless, preliminarily, again, it must be noted the jury in this matter found Mr.
Hansen 90 percent negligent, and Matthew Roberts 10 percent negligent. The jury verdict form
was such that the jury was asked to address the causation questions prior to determining
percentages of negligence of each party. R. p. 204-206. However, per Idaho Code §6-801, since
plaintiff Mr. Hansen's negligence was greater than defendant Matthew Roberts' negligence,

plaintiff could not recover any damages, no matter how the jury answered the causation
question. I.C. §6-801. John Droge's testimony was purely related to the question of causation,
and in particular whether the subject accident could have caused Mr. Hansen's claimed injuries.
Tr. p. 393, LL. 14-24.
Therefore, even if there was an error on the part of the trial court in allowing John
Droge's testimony, it was harmless error, at best. An appellate court will not reverse the district
court if the alleged error is harmless. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504, 95
P.3d 977, 986 (2004). "[I]f an error did not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not
affect the result of the trial, the error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Id. See Martin v.
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Hackworth, 127 Idaho 68, 70, 896 P.2d 976, 978 (1995); Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., 111
Idaho 594, 608, 726 P.2d 706,718 (1986).
Plaintiff does not provide this Court any argument or proof that a substantial right has
been affected by John Droge's testimony. Moreover, any error regarding the same cannot be
deemed to have affected the outcome of the trial, and was harmless.
However, defendant will address the substance of plaintiff's arguments in the instance the
appellant court disagrees with his position regarding harmless error. The following is the
exchange that occurred at trial during John Droge's testimony:

Q (MS. BRlZEE): What opinions have you formulated as a result of your review
and investigation in this matter?
MR. GORDON: Objection, Your Honor. I object to the foundation. To the
extent he's going to testify as a biomechanical engineer, there's been no
foundation laid to show that that scientific-whether scientific evidence that's
even beenTHE COURT: You may examine in aid of objection if you desire.
MR. GORDON: I don't. I just biomechanical engineering isn't considered a
legitimate scientific
THE COURT: I'm going to ovenllle the objection. If you feel more foundation
would be appropriate, Ms. Brizee, you may proceed how you desire.

Q (MS. BRlZEE): Well, Dr. Droge, let's deal with this. What is the science of
biomechanical engineering?
A (DR. DROGE): Biomechanical engineering is just take your engineering
principles, principles of physics and math and applying them to the human body.
In mechanical engineering, you would take a structure, and you would decide
what kind offorces it would take to fail that structure, whether it's a building or a,
you know, a metal pole or something. In biomechanical engineering what we do
is we take that same analysis and we just look at what kind of forces it's going to
take to fail structures of the human body.
Q: Is that the same as biomedical engineering?
A: There are a few different terms, and they are all related, yes. I like the term
biomechanics, because it refers to mechanical engineering in the title, but
bioengineering, yes.
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Q: And, in fact, your master of science is from the Department of Biomedical
Engineering at the University of Utah, correct?
A: Correct.

Q: All right. So Dr. Droge, again, what opinions have you formulated in this
matter?
MR. GORDON: Same objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Noted, overruled.

Tr. p. 391, L. 23 through p. 393, L. 13.
Clearly,

adequate

foundation was

laid relative to

the SCIence,

generally,

of

biomechanicallbiomedical engineering. Per John Droge's testimony, he received his master of
science from the Department of Biomedical Engineering at the University of Utah. Id. This is a
department at the University of Utah. Id. This is not some voodoo or junk science, as plaintiff
would have this Court believe.
Nevertheless, there was no pre-trial motion filed by plaintiff regarding this issue

despite

the interim two months between the first day of trial on October 19, 2010, and the second day of
trial on December 15, 2010.

Plaintiff never even requested the deposition of John Droge.

Therefore, plaintiff provided no case law or briefmg to the trial court, and provided no specific
objections to specific opinions or questions. Instead, plaintiff objected to his testimony on these
grounds in the middle ofJohn Droge's testimony. Tr. p. 391, L. 23 through p. 393, L. 13.
Further, when the Court offered the plaintiff the opportunity to question John Droge in
aid of his objection, plaintiff declined. Tr. p. 392, LL. 5-8. Therefore, the only basis for
plaintiffs argument in this regard before the trial court was plaintiffs counsel's unsupported
statement that biomechanical engineering is not considered a legitimate science. Tr. p. 392, LL.
7-8. There was nothing more presented by plaintiff in support for his objection. Now, for the first
time on appeal, plaintiff cites to case law and makes additional argument not provided to the trial
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court. Defendant submits plaintiff is precluded from now attempting to make these arguments, as
they were not before the trial court. The only thing before the trial court were counsel's
unsupported statements, nothing more. Nevertheless, the proper foundation for John Droge was
provided. By John Droge's own testimony, biomechanicallbiomedical engineering is a valid area
of study, and in fact, is an entire department at the University of Utah. Tr. p. 392, L. 13 through
p. 393, L. 9.
Furthermore, plaintiff now argues, for the first time on appeal, that specific sections of
John Droge's testimony were "unscientific" and "subjective."

Plaintiff has cited to specific

portions of the trial transcript. However, plaintiff proffered no specific objections to these
specific areas of questioning. Therefore, plaintiff has waived any such objections and cannot
now be heard to voice the same for the first time on appeal.
Also, plaintiff's argument regarding a Daubert inquiry is of interest. In Appellant's Brief,
plaintiff argues that ''to determine whether scientific knowledge will assist the trier of fact, a trial
court must make a two-step inquiry." Appellant's Brief, p. 13. He later argues: "Further, the trial
court did not act consistent with applicable legal standards because expert testimony is not
admissible unless the trial court makes a two-step inquiry to ensure the underlying scientific
principles are reliable and were properly applied." Appellant's Brief, p. 17. Plaintiff appears to
argue that before any expert witness called by any party can testifY, the trial court, on its own
volition, must make this inquiry. This is inaccurate. It is the parties' responsibility to raise such
issues. See e.g., Harris v. Sawtelle Rentals, Inc., 133 Idaho 139,204,984 P.2d 122, 127 (1999).
Plaintiff never raised the issue of whether the underlying scientific principles of John
Droge's opinions were reliable. Instead, plaintiff merely made a general objection that
biomechanical engineering is not a legitimate science.
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Again, there was nothing provided by

plaintiff to the trial court in support of his objection but the bare assertion of counsel, and
nothing more. Defendant submits this is not sufficient to trigger a full Daubert inquiry. In the
cases now relied upon by plaintiff on appeal, there were separate pre-trial motions on the issue,
and, at times, full evidentiary hearings. No such situation was created by plaintiff in the case at
bar. Instead, plaintiff relied upon an eleventh-hour general verbal objection, supported by
nothing more than counsel's arguments.
Plaintiff cites to Reali v. Mazda Motor of America. Inc., 106 F.Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me.
2000), in which the plaintiff was a front seat passenger in a Mazda when the Mazda was rearended.ld. at 76. He suffered "difuse axonal injury, a form of mild traumatic brain injury." !d. He
filed suit against Mazda, claiming a defectively designed seat caused his injuries. Id. Plaintiff
retained a biomechanical engineer in his case. Id. The defendant filed for summary judgment,
and filed a motion in limine to exclude portions of the plaintiff's biomechanical engineer's
testimony. Id. A review of the Reali opinion shows the parties provided a clear record to the trial

court relative to proposed testimony, and the specific issues in dispute, such as the ''threshold
level at which angular acceleration velocity leads to diffuse axonal injury." Id. at 77. Contrary to
plaintiff Mr. Hansen's assertions that the Reali court excluded all of the biomechanical
engineer's testimony, the Reali court allowed the biomechanical engineer to testifY on a number
of issues, including the threshold level, described above. Id. at 77.
For the first time on appeal, plaintiff now apparently argues John Droge's testimony
regarding Delta V forces is objectionable, based upon the Reali case. Plaintiff did not object to
this testimony at trial 0 f this matter. Tr. p. 398, L. 9 through p. 401, L. 9. Again, plaintiff only
objected at the beginning of John Droge's testimony on the grounds biomechanical engineering
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is not a legitimate science. Tr. p. 392, LL. 7-8. There was no specific objection, ever, relative to
John Droge testifYing about velocity.
Furthennore, while plaintiff wants to attempt to liken John Droge's trial testimony to the

Reali deposition testimony of plaintiff's expert, he fails. Since neither Reali nor this argument
were before the trial court, this is a moot issue. Nevertheless, John Droge testified his opinions
were based upon the deposition testimony, photographs of the vehicles, and repair estimates for
the vehicles, which were then validated using real world crashes with known speeds and

simulations. Tr. p. 391, LL. 1-l3; p. 398, L. l3 through p. 399, L. 10; Tr. p. 398, LL. 14-16.
While plaintiff attempts to characterize John Droge's opinions as an "initial gut feeling," and
"eyeball guess" (Appellant's Brief, p. 16), this is an absolute mischaracterization of John
Droge's testimony. Of interest, the Reali court's ruling that plaintiff's expert's Delta V figure
was unreliable was based on plaintiff's failure to produce evidence this is an acceptable way to
determine Delta V in response to defendant's specific motion regarding this issue. Id. at 77-78.
In the case at bar, since plaintiff never raised this issue below, neither defendant nor the court
had an opportunity to address this issue. Therefore, plaintiff cannot now be heard to say
defendant presented no evidence, when plaintiff did not raise the issue so that any such evidence
was required. However, John Droge's testimony goes beyond the testimony ofthe expert in Reali
and clearly he did more than the expert in Reali.
Plaintiff also relies upon Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.2d 646 (Nev. 2008). Once again, in
that case, a motion was filed prior to trial to attempt to preclude the testimony of the
biomechanical engineer. Id. at 649. Therefore, the parties, and the court, had an opportunity to
fully evaluate the motion. The Supreme Court of Nevada actually found on appeal that the trial
court had not abused its discretion when it determined the expert, Dr. Bowles, was qualified as
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an expert. !d. at 651. Dr. Bowles held a bachelors of science degree in mechanical engineering
and a doctorate in medicine (!d.) as compared to John Droge's master of science in
biomechanicallbiomedical engineering from the University of Utah. Tr. p. 393, LL. 6-9. The
Hallmark court then proceeded to review Nevada's version of the Daubert factors. Id. 651-654.

Courts should review these issues on a case-by-case basis. While the Hallmark court ultimately
found the trial court should not have let Dr. Bowles testifY to his opinions (Id. at 652). This was
on grounds not raised by plaintiff in the case at bar. Furthermore, other courts have allowed
biomechanicallbiomedical engineers to testifY. See e.g. Bowers v. Norfolk Southern Corp. et ai,
537 F.Supp.2d 1343 (M.D. Georgia 2007); Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 208 F.Supp.2d 470
(N.J. 2002). In particular, the Bowers court surveyed other case law and stated "biomechanical
engineers typically are found to be qualified to render an opinion as to the forces generated in a
particular accident and the general types of injuries those forces may generate." !d. at 1377. 9
John Droge was qualified to testifY at trial of this matter. Nevertheless, even if this court
believes it was an error for him to testifY at trial, any such error was harmless since the question
of causation became moot with the jury's apportionment ofnegligence between the parties.
In conclusion, each of plaintiffs three prongs of his attack on defendant's experts fails.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs unsupported, eleventh-hour
motions to attempt to preclude defendant's experts from testifYing. Furthermore, plaintiff has
failed to preserve many of the arguments he now makes on appeal. Finally, most of plaintiffs
arguments are related to testimony rendered moot and harmless given the jury's apportionment

9 Part of the motion by the opposing party in Bowers was to limit the expert so he could not testify as to specific causation. Id. 137778. No such motion or objection was ever made by Mr. Hansen.
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of negligence. Defendant's experts testified properly and appropriately, and the trial court's
rulings in this regard should be affirmed.
II.
PLAINTIFF WAIVED OBJECTIONS TO VIDEO TRIAL DEPOSITION; OBJECTIONS
WERE UNSUPPORTED; ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS

After the first day of trial, defendant Matthew Roberts received a telephone call from the
University of Utah stating a matching liver had been located for him and he needed to go to Salt
Lake City for his long-awaited liver transplant. Tr. p. 224, L. 7 through p. 225, L. 7. As a result,
the second day of trial was continued from October 20, 2010, to December 15,2010. Further,
Matthew Roberts was under strict medical orders and had to stay within a certain distance of the
University of Utah in case of a rejection of the transplanted liver, and was not allowed to be out
in public due to his suppressed immune system. Tr. p. 233, LL. 16-20; p. 234, L. 22 through p.
235, L. 13. Therefore, his trial testimony was videotaped in Salt Lake City, Utah, and his
testimony was played at the December 15, 2010, second day of trial. 10
Prior to the second day of trial, a hearing was held to hear motions relative to the video
trial transcript of Matthew Roberts. Per plaintiff's counsel's own remarks, the attorneys had
agreed objections would be addressed prior to trial. Tr. p. 258, LL. 1-411. Defendant filed a
motion to address his objections to the video trial testimony. R. p. 183-84. In his memorandum in
support, defendant alerted plaintiff he would have to have the DVD professionally edited before
it was played to the jury, and also provided notice he planned to play the entire video, with the
exception of the delineated portions he was asking the court to strike. R. p. 186. Plaintiff did not

10

Plaintiff had declined to take Matthew Roberts' deposition in this matter. Tr. p. 225, LL. 16-24.

11 It was defense counsel's recollection that the attorneys had agreed objections would be addressed "at the hearing next week,"
meaning the December 8, 2010, hearing. Tr. p. 259, LL. 23-25.
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file any written motion or other document asking the court to address additional objections or to
oppose defendant's intent to play all other portions of the video.
A hearing was held to hear objections to the video deposition on December 8, 2010. Tr.
p. 233-250. During this hearing, defendant's motion to strike and objections were discussed in
detail. Again, it was reiterated the DVD had to be professionally edited before trial. Tr. p. 235,
LL. 11-13. Clearly, the DVD could not be edited on the day of trial. This was a lengthy, arduous
hearing, wherein counsel went through those sections of the deposition transcript raised by
defendant line by line. Tr. p. 233, L. 1 through p. 250, L. 25. There was no way this could have
been done "on the fly" at trial when it was being presented to the jury. During the hearing, the
court gave plaintiff the opportunity to raise objections, or otherwise indicate whether there was
anything else to discuss. No objections were raised by plaintiff. Tr. p. 249, LL. 19-24.
On the second day of trial, on December 15, 2010, immediately prior to the playing of the
video trial deposition of Matthew Roberts, plaintiff raised the issue of his objections that he had
made during the actual taking of the deposition. He asked the court to address the objections
during the playing of the DVD to the jury. Tr. p. 257, L. 22 through p. 258, L. 25. The court, in
response, told plaintiff a hearing had been held the week prior where objections were raised so
the DVD could be edited prior to trial. Tr. p. 259, LL. 1-4. Plaintiff argued it was defendant's job
to make sure plaintiff's objections were argued to the court, and blamed defendant for plaintiff's
failure to raise this issue in a timely manner. Tr. p. 259, LL. 5-18.
Plaintiff went so far as to say it was defendant's responsibility to obtain a copy of the
transcript ofthe deposition for plaintiff. Tr. p. 261, LL. 20-24. However, the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure say otherwise. Per Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, if a party wants a copy of the audiovisual recording, then he needs to request one. IRCP 30(b )(4)(A). If a party desires a copy of the
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transcript, then he needs to request one, and can even, on motion, require the party who took the
deposition to provide a copy. IRCP 30(b)(4)(C). It was unknown to defendant whether or not
plaintiff had requested from the court reporter or videographer copies of the transcript or DVD.
Tr. p. 262, LL. 7-15. Further, plaintiff never filed a motion to cause defendant to provide a copy
of the transcript to him. In fact, plaintiff did nothing but attempt to blame defendant for his
failure to follow up and get his objections before the trial court in a timely manner, or otherwise
to respond to defendant's motion wherein it clearly was stated defendant planned to play all
portions of the video trial deposition, other than those portions defendant had moved to strike.
Plaintiff refers this court to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 32(b). However, when dealing
with a video trial deposition, which requires extensive editing of the DVD, the process is very
different from merely reading into the record a written transcript of a deposition. Again, the
editing cannot be done last minute, immediately prior to the introduction of the DVD.
Plaintiff, on appeal, further attempts to perpetuate his argument that defendant is to blame
for his failure to voice his objections, and further attempts to twist the factual situation, by
arguing it was defense counsel's responsibility to argue plaintiffs objections. Appellant's Brief,
p. 18. There is nothing in the record showing defense counsel told plaintiffs counsel she would
lobby and argue his objections for him to the court.

This argument, in and of itself, is

disingenuous. This is akin to a party arguing the other party should have voiced his objections
for him at trial.
Nevertheless, it was clear to the court that plaintiff had an opportunity to ralse any
objections to the DVD at the December 8, 2010, hearing. By asking Mr. Ipsen if the plaintiffhad
filed a motion, the court was opening the door for Mr. Ipsen to voice any objections. The court's
comment indicated this was the time and place for the plaintiff to raise any objections. The
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question asked by the court was: "All right. You had not filed a motion, Mr. Ipsen?" Tr. p. 249,
LL. 21-22. This came after defendant specifically stated, "We've covered everything on my
motion." Tr. p. 249, LL. 19-20. This interchange allowed Mr. Ipsen the opportunity to voice any
objections on behalf of plaintiff. This clearly was the time and place to do so, and nothing was
verbalized. It had been made very clear the DVD was going to have to be edited in preparation
for trial. The trial court appropriately deemed the plaintiffs failure to raise any objections at this
point in time a waiver of any such objections. This was within the trial court's discretion, as the
trial court was present for this interchange, and the manner in which the questions were asked
and the manner in which the court and counsel were communicating. Trial court decisions
regarding the admitting or excluding of evidence is reviewed solely for an abuse of discretion.
Highland Enterprises Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 345, 986 P.2d 996, 1011 (1999).
While plaintiff argues he was not required to submit a motion on his objections, the
record is clear plaintiff knew of defendant's plan to play all of the video deposition at trial, with
the exception of those portions subject to defendant's motion to strike. In this situation, a
plaintiff cannot merely decide to ignore this information, which was clearly communicated in
defendant's memorandum (R. p. 186), ignore the hearing on the issue, and then later, when it is
no longer possible to edit the DVD, to voice objections. The December 8, 2010, hearing was the
time and place for plaintiff to timely raise any objections. This was a lengthy hearing, and made
very clear this same process could not possibly be repeated in the middle of trial.

Even if

plaintiff was not prepared to argue on December 8, 201 0, he still had a week to raise any
objections to the DVD, and failed to do so until the eleventh hour, when it was too late to
accommodate the same due to the need to edit the DVD.
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Nevertheless, even if this Court disagrees with the trial court's ruling in this regard, none
of the objections plaintiff now argues would have impacted the outcome of this trial. These
objections clearly were unsupported, as follows:
1.

Plaintiff argues the amount of the property damage to Matthew Roberts' vehicle

as a result of the accident would not have been admitted into evidence, had his objections been
ruled on by the court. Appellant's Brief, p. 20-21. However, this exact same issue was addressed
during plaintiff's testimony, and the trial court allowed into evidence the plaintiff's document
and plaintiff's testimony regarding the cost of repairs to plaintiff's vehicle as a result of the
accident. Tf. p. 278, L. 8 through p. 281, L. 2. Likewise, the repair document and testimony of
Matthew Roberts were admissible. Nevertheless, Matthew Roberts testified not only that the
repair estimates were true and correct copies of the documents he received from the two auto
body shops, but he also testified to his own independent recollection of the amounts of the same.
If. p. 298, L. 11 through p. 303, L. 6. 12 Defendant submits even if this court believes there was
some kind of error, any error on the part of the trial court is harmless. Matthew Roberts certainly
was allowed to testifY to his recollection of the amounts of the repair estimates, if nothing else,
which put the dollar amount of the repairs into the record. Furthermore, the appropriate
foundation was provided for the documents themselves to be entered into evidence. Parties are
allowed to testifY to the amount of property damage to their vehicles in an auto collision.
2.

Plaintiff next argues a party cannot testifY to what he said to other people.

Plaintiff argues this is somehow hearsay. Matthew Roberts testified to what he told the 911
12 Plaintiff refers this court to two cases in support of his argument that repair estimates are uniformly considered hearsay.
Appellant's Brief, p. 21. However neither of these cases involve written repair estimates for vehicle damage. The first case, Marshall
v. Bare, 107 Idaho 210, 687 P.2d 591 (CLApp. 1984), the defendant attempted to enter into evidence only the verbal statements of
other contractors to show the work could have been done at a lower rate. There were no written repair estimates provided. The
second case, State v. Miller, 141 Idaho 148, 106 P.3d 474 (CLApp. 2004) involved the issue of whether a probation receipt used to
package methamphetamine could be used to show the defendant was the owner of the drugs.
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dispatcher and what he told the investigating officer. Per Idaho Rule of Evidence 801, hearsay is
a statement made by an out-of-court declarant. Matthew Roberts was not reciting what other
people told him, but what he himself told other people. This is not hearsay. Furthermore,
Matthew Roberts was not an out-of-court declarant and certainly was available for crossexamination by plaintiff Per Jolley v. Clay, 103 Idaho 171,646 P.2d 413 (1982), "(t)he out-ofcourt statements of parties to litigation are, and always have been, admissible, whether classified
as non-hearsay or as an exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 175, 646 P.2d at 417.
Nevertheless, even if this Court believes Judge Woodland was in error, and then agrees with
plaintiff these statements by Matthew Roberts were hearsay, any such error is harmless. Matthew
Roberts merely testified he told the plaintiffhe was going to call 911. He told dispatch neither he
nor plaintiff were injured and that his car was in the middle of the road. He testified he told the
police officer the same information he had just provided in his testimony. Tr. p. 310, L. 8
through p. 312, L. 12. None of this information in any way impacted the jury verdict in this
matter.
3.

Plaintiffs third alleged error involves the question asked of Matthew Roberts as

to whether he received a citation from the police officer as a result of the subject collision.
Appellant's Brief, p. 22.

Of note, plaintiff filed a pre-trial motion with the court, asking that

defendant be prohibited from entering into evidence the fact the plaintiff, as a result of the
accident, had received a citation from the investigating police officer. R. p. 134-38. After
significant argument, Judge Anderson granted plaintiffs motion. Tr. p. 39, L. 16 through p. 55,
L. 1. While plaintiff now wants to expand his motion and Judge Anderson's ruling into
something more than it was, at no time did plaintiff ever request a pre-trial order to preclude
defendant from testifYing he did not receive a citation as a result of the subject collision. A
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review of the documentation and the verbal statements of counsel and the court clearly show the
only issue on plaintiffs motion in limine was the citation that had been issued to the plaintiff
after the accident. 13 Furthermore, plaintiffs objection at the time of the question was that it was
irrelevant. Now, for the first time in appeal, plaintiff attempts to argue the question was asked in
violation of the court's order. Plaintiff waived any such objection. Also, clearly, the fact the
defendant did not receive a citation was relevant to this matter, and to Matthew Roberts' defense
in this matter. Plaintiff also argues this question -- and Matthew Roberts' answer -- somehow
imply the plaintiff did receive a citation. No such implication exists. In many accidents, no
citation is issued. If plaintiff was worried about any such implication, he could have filed a
motion in limine to preclude such testimony. No such motion was ever filed.
Plaintiff concludes his arguments on this issue by speculating what the jury would have
done and how this would have changed the jury outcome. Plaintiff attempts to argue the question
the jury asked about apportionment in the middle of deliberations somehow indicates or predicts
what the jury would have done if plaintiffs objections had been upheld. At the end of the day,
the jury apportioned 90 percent 0 f the fault to plaintiff, and only 10 percent to Matthew Roberts.
Implicit in the jury's question, if the parties are going to speculate on the same, was the fact all
the jurors thought plaintiff was more at fault than Matthew Roberts. Tr. p. 491, L. 22 through p.
495, L. 13.
However, defendant submits this is all speculative, and any error on the part 0 f the trial
court in deeming plaintiff to have waived his objections to the video trial deposition by not
presenting them prior to trial was harmless. The objections voiced by plaintiff during the video

13

Judge Anderson ruled, "In other words, the parties will not testify that there was a citation or submit the citation for admission into

evidence." Tr. p. 51, LL. 21-23. The only citation that was issued was the citation issued to the plaintiff.
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trial deposition were unsupported and not viable. Matthew Roberts' testimony about the amount
of the repair estimates would have still come into evidence, as would have his testimony of the
statements he himself made, and his testimony that he did not receive a citation as a result of the
accident.
In conclusion, the trial court did not err in ruling plaintiff had the opportunity to ask the
court to review and rule on his objections on the DVD of Matthew Roberts' trial testimony, and
that plaintiff had waived the same by not voicing them prior to the day the DVD was to be
played to the jury. However, any error on the part of the trial court, if any, in this regard was
harmless, since the objections were not valid, and the information would have come into
evidence. The jury verdict should be allowed to stand.
III.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN
LIMINE REGARDING INSURANCE; PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESERVE
OBJECTIONS

In this matter, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting an order precluding plaintiff
from mentioning insurance or the insurance industry during the course of trial, including during
voir dire. R. p. 123.
During the pre-trial conference, The Honorable Judge Anderson held oral argument on
several motions in limine, including defendant's motion in limine to preclude mention of
insurance during trial. Tr. p. 22, L. 2 through p. 24, L. 17. No written objection or opposition
was filed by plaintiff relative to this motion in limine. The only opposition by plaintiff was
voiced during oral argument at the pre-trial conference. Plaintiffs sole objection was he wanted
to be able to inquire of jurors about their current occupations to make sure no jurors were
working in the insurance industry. Tr. 22, L. 17 through p. 23, L. 7. Plaintiff argued he should be
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able to ask questions of the jurors about their current occupations. Tr. p. 22, L. 25 through p. 23,
L. 2.

The court and counsel and the clerk then discussed whether the occupations of the jurors
and the occupations of the jurors' spouses were included on the jury questionnaire. The clerk
informed the court and counsel that the Bonneville County jury questionnaire does include both
the juror's employment and the jurors' spouse's employment. Tr. p. 23, L. 8 through p. 24, L. 1.
As a result, Judge Anderson granted defendant's motion in limine, since plaintiff's sole
objection was already taken care of with the jury questionnaire. This was not an abuse of the

trial court's discretion.
Judge Anderson even provided plaintiff an opportunity for relief if a juror failed to fill
out the employment information, or the employment information for his/her spouse. Judge
Anderson specifically ruled if this information was not completed by a juror, then the jury
commissioner would meet with the juror and obtain this information, and have the juror fill out
this information outside the presence of the rest of the jury. Tr. p. 24, LL. 2-14., R. p. 178-179.
A ruling on a motion in limine is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Loza v.
Arroyo Dairy, 137 Idaho 764, 53 P.3d 347 (2002). The decision of the trial court "in permitting

or refusing the asking of questions related to insurance companies is a matter of the court's
discretion. Unless abused, that discretion will not be disturbed on appeaL" Kozlowski v. Rush,
121 Idaho 825,831,828 P.2d 854,860 (1992), citing to Owen v. Burchman, 100 Idaho 441, 444,
599 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1979).
Furthermore, as stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901,
907, 120 P.3d 289 (Ct.App. 2005), Idaho's cases do not state a trial court must allow questioning
of jurors about insurance. The Harris court stated the idea that such questioning
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be allowed,

does not mean it must be allowed, and stated trial judges may prohibit such questioning during
voir dire:
The fact that this practice is not forbidden by Idaho law does not mean that a trial
court must allow it. The decision whether to allow inquiries relating to insurance
companies during voir dire is a matter within the trial court's discretion....
Therefore, the trial judges of this court are free to prohibit this practice in their
courtrooms.

fd.
The Harris court went on to provide examples of how this could be done, such as
prohibiting questions during voir dire unless permission is requested and obtained from the
court ahead of time upon a showing of need. fd. The Harris court stated this would "protect the
legitimate interests of both parties." fd.
Therefore, defendant submits Judge Anderson was within his discretion to grant
defendant's motion in limine, especially given the fact the court and the clerk dealt with, and
resolved, plaintiffs sole objection to the motion in limine.
It should be noted, on the morning of the first day of trial, plaintiff asked to "make a

record on the insurance issue." Tf. p. 64, LL. 15-16. This was not a motion for reconsideration,
but merely a move to "make a record" on the insurance issue. During this record-making
process, plaintiffs counsel then made new arguments not previously made to Judge Anderson
during the pre-trial conference. Plaintiff then proceeded into a lengthy discussion of tort reform,
and attempted to somehow link tort reform to insurance. Plaintiff argued by not allowing him to
mention the word "insurance," he was precluded from inquiring as to tort reform. Tf. p. 64, L. 15
through p. 65, L. 5. Defendant and the court agreed plaintiff could inquire of the jurors about
tort reform, but he just could not bring insurance into the questioning. Tf. p. 66, L. 24 through p.
67, L. 7.
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Despite the fact this is not a bad faith case, plaintiff also added to his record an argument
that Judge Anderson's ruling precluded him from asking the jurors about insurance claims they
might have made. Tr. p. 65, LL. 6-14. Plaintiff also put into the record information about his
beliefs regarding financial bias of jurors, and attempted to link that issue to insurance. Tr. p. 65,
L. 23 through p. 66, L. 5.

Defendant submits none of these new issues precluded plaintiff from selecting a fair and
impartial paneL It is defendant's position allowing plaintiff to inquire into these irrelevant issues
would have only served to introduce insurance into the juror's minds. Nevertheless, since
plaintiff did not ask the court to reconsider Judge Anderson's ruling, then on appeal this court
must look only to the information and argument provided to Judge Anderson when he made the
original ruling. None of plaintiff's new statements to "make a record" the first day of trial with
Judge Woodland were argued before Judge Anderson during the pre-trial conference in this
matter. 14 Therefore, plaintiff is precluded from now making these arguments on appeaL
As a general rule, the Idaho Supreme Court will not consider an alleged error not
preserved for appeal by an objection at triaL State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 784,241 P.3d 955,
957 (2010). See Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 921, 104 P.3d 958, 963 (2004); State v.
Barnes, 147 Idaho 587,597,212 P.3d 1017, 1027 (Ct. App. 2009) ("It is a fundamental tenet of
appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is
preserved for appeal") (quoting State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App.
2000)).

14 It is defendant's position that plaintiff's statements to Judge Woodland, were, as represented by plaintiff's counsel, his making of a
record regarding Judge Anderson's ruling. However, even if this court treats these statements as a motion that needed to be ruled
on by Judge Woodland, defendant submits any ruling by Judge Woodland on this issue likewise was within his discretion and not an
abuse of discretion.

32

The purpose of this limitation on appellate court authority is to require the timely raising
of claims and objections thereby allowing the trial court the opportunity to consider and resolve
the same. State v. Longest, 149 Idaho at 784, 241 P.3d at 957. The trial court is in the best
position to detennme the relevant facts and to resolve the dispute. ld. The requirement of a
contemporaneous objection prevents a party from sandbagging the court by remaining silent
about an objection and belatedly raising the error if the case is not decided in his or her favor. ld.
In order for an objection to be preserved for appellate review, the party must either clearly
provide the specific ground for the objection or the basis of the objection must be clear from the
context ofthe trial record. Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho at 921,104 P.3d at 963.
Furthermore, per Thompson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 205 P.3d 1235 (2009), "if the
objecting party made the wrong objection, that is not error by the trial court. When an objection
is made, the trial court is only asked to detennme the validity of that objection; it is not asked to
detennme whether there is another objection that would have been sustained had it been made."
ld. at 105-106,205 P.3d at 1241-42.

On appeal, plaintiff now argues the trial court erred by "prohibiting Hansen from
inquiring whether a prospective juror or one of his family members were or had ever been
employed by an insurance carrier." Appellant's Brief, p. 23. This is different than the objection
voiced by plaintiff at the time and the place for the hearing on the motion in limine. At the
hearing, plaintiff only objected on the grounds plaintiff should be entitled to know if the juror or
the juror's spouse is currently working in the insurance industry. Tr. p. 24, L. 22 through p. 23,

L. 15. There was no objection relative to other family members, or past employment, which
plaintiff now wants to argue on appeal.
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Plaintiff argues error now on different grounds than were before Judge Anderson.

Plaintiff

never raised these grounds before Judge Anderson and cannot now be heard to argue Judge
Anderson's made the wrong decision when these grounds were not before Judge Anderson.
Plaintiff has failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
Nevertheless, in the instance this court determines to consider this issue, defendant
submits Judge Anderson did not abuse his discretion in ruling on the motion in limine. The case
law relied upon by plaintiff does not support his position that Judge Anderson did abuse his
discretion. This is in part because this is a discretionary call on the part of the trial judge. None
of the cases cited to by plaintiff are directly on point. That is because when the appellate review
is an abuse of discretion standard, there is great deference given to the trial court's ruling. None
of the cases relied upon by plaintiff involved a pre-trial motion in limine. None of the cases
relied upon by plaintiff involved a situation wherein a pre-trial ruling had been made that
insurance could not be mentioned in voir dire, with the exception of the two later cases,
Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825,828 P.2d 854 (1992) and Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 120
P.3d 289 (et. App. 2005), which will be discussed herein.
For instance, plaintiff cites to Wilson v. St. Joe Boom Co., 34 Idaho 253, 200 P. 289
(1921) for the proposition that it is the "privilege" of the plaintiff to inquire "whether a
prospective juror or one of his family members are or have ever been employed by an insurance
carrier." Appellant's Brief, p. 24. Plaintiff has artfully phrased this statement to make it sound as
if every plaintiff has a right to make this inquiry. IS This is not what the Wilson court stands for.
In fact, the Wilson court stated, to the contrary, that "the line of demarcation between prejudicial
Ironically, in all of the cases cited by plaintiff, the only time the word "privilege" appears is in Faris v. Burroughs Adding Machine
Co., 48 Idaho 310, 282 P. 72 (1929) wherein the court said it is "the privilege of a party, within reasonable limits and good faith, to
ascertain the occupation of a juror and the extent of his possible interest in the trial ... " Id. at 321.
15

34

and nonprejudicial questions and remarks in the examination of jurors must depend upon the
particular circumstances of the case." Id. at 261. The same is true of the second case cited by
plaintiff, Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654, 203 P. 289 (1921), wherein the court stated that
counsel may be permitted to examine a juror about insurance. Id. at 664. The Cochran court did
not say this was a "right" or a "privilege" as now argued by plaintiff on appeal. The next case
cited by plaintiff, Bressan v. Herrick, 35 Idaho 217, 205 P. 555 (1922), merely cites to Wilson,
supra, and states the "may" rule from Wilson. Bressan at 221.
In Faris v. Burroughs Adding Machine Co., 48 Idaho 310, 282 P. 72 (1929), also cited by
plaintiff, the plaintiff s counsel actually inquired about a specific insurance carrier, the American
Automobile Insurance Company, and made an offer of proof, stating "we are advised that there
is an insurance company connected or interested in the suit." Id. at 316. Apparently, these earlier
cases took place before the rules of discovery allowed a party to ascertain whether an insurance
carrier provided any coverage for the claims being made in the litigation. Furthermore, in Faris,
the defendant agreed the voir dire inquiry was appropriate, so the issue of the voir dire
questioning was not at issue - it was plaintiffs counsel's offer of proof statement that was at
issue. Id. at 317.
In Shady v. Daley, 58 Idaho 536, 76 P. 279 (1938), also cited by plaintiff, the court
merely relied upon Wilson and Cochran cases. Shady at 539. However, it should be noted it does
not appear defense counsel objected to the voir dire question at issue in that case. The same is
true of Byington v. Horton, 61 Idaho 389,102 P.2d 652 (1940), another case cited by plaintiff.
Id. at 394-95. In Byington, the court cited to Shaddy and its predecessors, but notably also cited
to two California cases wherein it was stated the plaintiff may ask broad questions of the
potential jurors, and the questions must be asked in such a way that there is no emphasis that the
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defendant is insured. Id. In Faris, supra, the court subsequently allowed plaintiff to ask whether
any members of the jury were "pecuniary interested in any company or concern, in which you
may be connected, that would have, or could have any interest in the result of this case." Faris at
320. This was allowed by the court to avoid any inference of insurance. Id. Defendant submits
plaintiff certainly could have asked a broader question to ascertain bias of jurors, without
mentioning insurance companies, per se, such as whether any of the jurors had a financial
interest in the outcome of the trial. Plaintiff chose not to ask any such questions, and cannot now
be heard to complain.
In Owen v. Burchman, 100 Idaho 441, 599, P.2d 1012 (1979), the court again relied upon

its predecessors, Shady and Byington and indicated the court's allowance of plaintiff's inquiry
regarding insurance was not an abuse of discretion. Owen at 444.
It is important to note none of the cases cited by plaintiff involved a specific pre-trial
motion in limine to address the issue of whether insurance could be mentioned during trial and to
what extent. Again, in the case at bar, defendant filed a motion in limine on this matter and the
only objection raised by plaintiff at the hearing on the same was considered by Judge Anderson,

and was resolved. The only objection raised by plaintiff was that he believed he was entitled to
know of the current occupation of the jurors, which was resolved via the jury questionnaire.
Therefore, these cases relied upon by plaintiff are distinguishable, on their face.
It should also be noted, plaintiffs 1920-1930 cases discuss jury bias in terms of whether
the juror has a potential financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. However, in order to
actually get to the root of whether a juror has an interest in the outcome of the litigation via a
relationship with an insurance carrier, the specific insurance carrier would have to be mentioned.
Defendant submits to do so would absolutely be in violation of the strong precedent set by the
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jUdiciary of Idaho to avoid creating a prejudicial situation for the defendant by allowing evidence
of involvement of an insurance company. See e.g. Loza v. Arroyo Dairy. 137 Idaho 764, 766-67,
53 P.3d 347, 349-50 (2002).
Furthermore, plaintiff seems to forget that Matthew Roberts filed a separate small claims
action against him. Therefore, the potential prejudice that comes with introducing insurance into
the minds of the jurors would have cut both ways, and against both parties, since plaintiff was
also a defendant in this consolidated action, and also insured.
Plaintiff refers this Court to Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828 P.2d 854 (1992) and
Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 120 P.3d 289 (Ct. App. 2005). In Kozlowski, the Honorable

Peter D. McDermott ruled on a pre-trial motion brought by the plaintiffs, and declined to allow
plaintiffs to question jurors about the "insurance crisis." Id. at 830-31. The plaintiffs asked the
court's permission to engage in this line of questioning prior to trial. Id. Importantly, the
Kozlowski court emphasized that in the cases it relied upon, the court had recognized, first, that

there was possible exposure to the insurance advertisements - the advertisements plaintiffs were
claiming entitled them to ask jurors about the alleged "insurance crisis." !d. at 833. However,
the Kozlowski court concluded ''there has not been a sufficient showing here that the potential
jurors may have been exposed to such advertisements." !d. The court remanded the case for other
reasons, and indicated the plaintiffs would have another opportunity to raise this issue with the
trial court. Id. at 833-34.
Defendant submits the Harris court, supra, promulgated the best rule -- that this issue
should be left to the discretion of the trial court, so that it can be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. There are numerous factors that could steer the court's determination of this issue one way
or another. For instance, there still exist situations wherein there is no insurance coverage for
37

defendant for plaintiff's claims. Therefore, there cannot possibly be any reason to inquire into
insurance during jury selection, except for plaintiff's desire to create the impression there is
insurance coverage available. There are also instances wherein the trial court may believe it
needs to put parameters upon jury questioning by a specific attorney due to past experience with
counsel, and counsel's inability to inquire in good faith. There may be a myriad of other potential
scenarios in which the trial court, in its discretion, needs to be able to craft a ruling regarding the
issue of insurance -- on a motion in limine from either party -- that is specific to the needs of the
particular parties and/or particular claims in the case.
Plaintiff advocates for a blanket rule allowing all plaintiffs to inquire of all juries about
insurance. However, this is not a "one size fits all" situation. There are too many potential
situations wherein the trial court should have the freedom to either prohibit questioning of a jury
about insurance, or place specific parameters around the same. The risk of prejudice is too high
to create a blanket rule in this regard. Clearly, the courts of Idaho have recognized this risk, per
Idaho Rule 411, and the ensuing case law interpreting the same and prohibiting evidence the
defendant is insured. See e.g. See e.g. Loza v. Arroyo Dairy, l37 Idaho 764, 766-67, 53 P.3d 347,
349-50 (2002).
Defendant submits the Harris court's ruling in this regard, which preserves this issue for
the trial court's discretion, is the proper rule oflaw.
It should be noted, many courts in other jurisdictions have ruled any mention of insurance

during voir dire is prejudicial error and grounds for mistrial or reversal. See e.g. Maness v.
Bullins, 198 S.E.2d 752, 752-53 (Ct.N.C. 1973) (ruled that plaintiff's question to panel whether

any member felt his liability rates would increase if he returned a verdict

"could only be

calculated to instill in the minds of the Jurors that defendants have adequate liability
38

insurance ... " and was prejudicial); Speet v. Bacaj, 377 S.E.2d 397, 398 (Va. 1989) (upholding
trial court's denial of motion by plaintiff to inquire about insurance crisis); Brockett v. Tice, 445
S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1969) (ruling questions whether jurors had any connection with insurance
company, and whether jurors believed a verdict in that case would affect their insurance rates
were to deliberately and knowingly asked to convey impression defendant had insurance);
Murrell v. Spillman, 442 S.W.2d 590 (Ct.App.Ky. 1969) (upholding trial court's ruling
prohibiting questions regarding advertising by insurance companies regarding the impact of large
verdicts); Russo v. Birrenkott, 770 P.2d 1335 (Ct.App.Colo.1988) (upholding ruling of trial court
prohibiting inquiry by plaintiff of jurors regarding newspaper articles about jury verdicts being
too high because such articles are usually related to tort insurance reform). See also, AJ Miller
Trucking Co. v. Wood, 474 S.W.2d 763 (Texas 1971); Garcia v. Estate of Wilkinson, 800 P.2d
l380 (Ct.App.Colo. 1990).
In Langley v. Turner's Exp. Inc., 375 F.2d 296 (4 th Cir. 1967), the court summed the
situation up best when.it stated the trial court must balance the competing interests ofthe parties,
and ruled the balance weighs in favor of not having the jury award damages without fault
because it was aware there were insurance proceeds available:
We must strike a balance between the probability of danger to plaintiffs that
someone sympathetic to insurance companies may remain on the jury and the
danger to the defendant that the jury may award damages without fault if aware
that there is insurance coverage to pay the verdict. We think the latter danger is
the greater than is the former.
Id. at 297.
Finally, plaintiff attempts to argue his own motion to strike a juror for cause shows
support for his position. As defendant has already argued, plaintiff cannot invite error, and then
use it as support for his position. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66, 844 P.2d 691, 695 (1992).
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Doing so constitutes invited error, and is not permitted. Id.

A party may not successfully

complain of errors that he or she has acquiesced in or invited. State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836,
838, 673 P.2d 436,438 (1983), citing Walling v. Walling, 36 Idaho 710, 214 P. 218 (1923).
Errors which are consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible. Id., citing Frank v.
Frank, 47 Idaho 217, 273 P. 943 (1929).
During jury selection, juror Sarah Hix stated she worked for Allstate Insurance. Tr. p. 71,
LL. 21-24. At the close of voir dire, plaintiff's counsel requested Ms. Hix and another juror be

dismissed for cause, and they were excused for cause. Tr. p. 101, L. 24 through p. 102, L. 18.
Plaintiff's counsel made the motion, defense counsel did not object, and the trial court promptly
removed these two jurors from the panel. Id.

Plaintiff did not have to use any peremptory

challenges, so plaintiff was not prejudiced, and cannot show the jury panel that heard the
evidence in this matter was biased.
In State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 569, 808 P.2d 1313, 1314 (1991), the trial cOUli denied
the criminal defendant's challenge for cause of an allegedly substantially impaired juror.
Ultimately, the defendant used one of his peremptory challenges to excuse the subject juror from
the jury panel. Id. The defendant argued he was prejudiced, and specifically relied upon the
holding in State v. Dickens, 68 Idaho 173, 191 P.2d 364 (1948), for the premise his right to
exercise his full complement of peremptory challenges was impaired since he was forced to use
one of his peremptory challenges to remove said juror, thus warranting reversal. Id.
However, the Ramos court relied upon its holding in State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho 312, 486
P .2d 1025 (1971) to implicitly overrule the statement in Dickens, supra. Id., 119 Idaho at 570,
808 P.2d at 1315. In Ramos, this Court determined the defendant failed to show he was
prejudiced by being required to use a peremptory challenge to remove the subject juror. Id.
40

Furthennore, this Court held the defendant did not demonstrate, nor even suggest, any of the
other jurors remaining on the panel were biased or not impartial. Id. The Court ruled ifthere was
any error, it was harmless. Id. 16

In the present case, the court excused Ms. Hix for cause, on

plaintiff s unopposed request. Plaintiff did not even have to use a peremptory challenge to
excuse Ms. Hix. Any claim that the jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who actually
sat on the jury. Ramos, supra. Plaintiff has not demonstrated, or suggested, any of the other
jurors remaining on the panel were biased or not impartial. Ramos, supra. Plaintiff did not
challenge for cause any of the jurors who ultimately sat on the jury. Plaintiff passed the rest of
the jury for cause and cannot show any bias or prejudice 0 f a sitting juror. Tr. p. 101, L. 24
through p. 102, L. 18.
The sitting jury in this case was impartial, Ms. Hix was not on the jury, and thus, plaintiff
did not suffer any prejudice.
Again, plaintiff on appeal argues, for the first time, new arguments that were never
before Judge Anderson during the hearing on defendant's motion in limine. Defendant submits
Judge Anderson listened to plaintiffs objections, and assured himself and counsel that plaintiffs
concerns were alleviated via the jury questionnaire. Judge Anderson's decision was within the
bounds of discretion and should not be overturned on appeal.
IV.
MATTHEW ROBERTS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Matthew Roberts submits he is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121
and Idaho Rule 0 f Civil Procedure 54( e)( 1), which provide that fees may be awarded by the court
when it finds the case was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

16

See supra for case law regarding harmless error.
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Despite the clear and unambiguous law, and the jury verdict in favor of Matthew Roberts, the
lawsuit filed by plaintiff has continued to the appellate level. Matthew Roberts has been required
to continue to defend this matter.
The law of Idaho is clear on the issues involved, plaintiffs position is not supported by
Idaho law, and plaintiffs position did not include any argument or support for a change in Idaho
law. Therefore, the continued pursuit of this matter to the appellate level was frivolous,
unreasonable and without foundation. This is sufficient grounds for recovery of costs and fees.
Nevertheless, Matthew Roberts submits he will be the prevailing party on appeal, and, therefore,
is also entitled to costs and fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Matthew Roberts respectfully requests the rulings of the trial

court in this matter now challenged by plaintiff on appeal be affirmed, in all respects.
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